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BOOK REVIEW 
ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO HIDE: SEXUAL 
ASSAULT AND SILENCE IN HOLLYWOOD AND 
THE LAWYERS WHO LET IT HAPPEN 
Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a Conspiracy to Protect 
Predators.  By Ronan Farrow.  Little, Brown and Company.  2019.  
Pp. 464.  $26.99.  ISBN-10: 0316486639; ISBN-13: 978-
0316486637. 
Reviewed by Neil Fulton* 
Hollywood stars and moguls, sexual misconduct and harassment, in-
vestigative journalism, espionage, and unethical lawyer conduct—all this 
and more is on display in Ronan Farrow’s Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a 
Conspiracy to Protect Predators.  Working for NBC News and then The New 
Yorker, Farrow investigated allegations of serial sexual assault by Harvey 
Weinstein.  He readily found women who said they had been assaulted by 
Weinstein, but getting those stories to the public required navigating an ob-
stacle course of non-disclosure agreements, corporate legal departments, un-
ethical conduct by Weinstein’s legal team, and even being followed by spies.  
In the end, however, Farrow got these women’s stories out and found serial 
sexual misconduct in other high-profile places.  Catch and Kill provides a 
fascinating lens to think about professional responsibility, corporate govern-
ance, how the law responds to sexual misconduct, and the boundaries of con-
tract law. 
  
 
* Neil Fulton is the fourteenth dean of the University of South Dakota School of Law.  He 
received his B.A. from Yale and his J.D., summa cum laude, from the University of Minnesota.  
The author wishes to acknowledge insights from his wife Molly and members of his book club with 
whom he read and discussed Catch and Kill. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ronan Farrow’s book, Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a Conspiracy 
to Protect Predators1 (“Catch and Kill”), is the story of his investigation of 
Harvey Weinstein’s pattern of sexual harassment and assault, the challenge 
of getting that story into print, and the other public figures whose similar 
misconduct subsequently came to light.  One could ask why lawyers should 
be interested.  Lawyers are central to the harrowing tale Farrow tells.  In fact, 
the book largely demonstrates that without the involvement of lawyers, often 
acting at or beyond the boundary of ethical conduct, Weinstein and other 
predators would have been exposed years earlier.  Nondisclosure agreements 
are also central to the story, helping the wealthy and powerful silence their 
victims, hide their misconduct, and continue their predatory patterns.  Read-
ing the book forces consideration of the role of lawyers as moral and ethical 
actors and whether nondisclosure agreements are contracts that should not 
be enforceable.  In short, the book is one that lawyers should read and care-
fully consider.  That consideration must begin with the underlying story Far-
row tells.   
II. CATCHING A PREDATOR 
The story begins with Farrow working as an investigative reporter for 
NBC News.2  His reporting uncovered suggestions that Weinstein, a mas-
sively successful and politically connected movie producer,3 had engaged in 
sexual harassment and even sexual assault.4  Beginning from the report by 
actress Rose McGowan that Weinstein raped her, Farrow interviewed many 
women who reported that Weinstein engaged in a pattern of sexual miscon-
duct, ranging from harassment to rape.5  Once the surface was scratched, 
Farrow uncovered that Weinstein’s history of sexually predatory conduct 
 
1. RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT 
PREDATORS (2019). 
2. Id. at 4–5. 
3. Id. at 9–12. 
4. Id. at 29–33. 
5. Id. at 56–59, 93, 128–32, 167–70, 238–42, 245–46, 300–03.   
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was widely known or at least suspected.6  However, attempting to expose 
these stories into the open posed several severe challenges. 
First, Weinstein built walls of silence around his victims through non-
disclosure agreements.7  Leveraging his power to make or break entertain-
ment industry careers, Weinstein pushed victims to accept cash payouts 
paired with highly restrictive confidentiality clauses to remain silent.8  As a 
powerful example, Weinstein pressured Italian actress Ambra Gutierrez to 
sign a settlement agreement with a non-disclosure clause, which required her 
to: (1) not disclose that Weinstein groped her; (2) to destroy any and all cop-
ies of recorded admissions made by Weinstein; (3) to allow Weinstein’s law-
yers access to all her digital media; and (4) to sign a written statement—to 
be released if she breached—declaring that none of Weinstein’s admitted 
conduct occurred.9  Gutierrez told Farrow that when she signed the agree-
ment, she spoke limited English, had been subjected to attacks on her char-
acter by Weinstein, and had deep concerns about the potential damage to her 
and her family if she persisted in trying to hold Weinstein accountable for 
groping her.10  The power of these contracts to purchase silence was intensi-
fied through the inclusion of financially oppressive liquidated damage 
clauses for breach, and arbitration clauses that allowed confidential enforce-
ment.11  Breaking through these walls was challenging. 
Second, Weinstein applied intense pressure on his victims and media 
outlets to prevent disclosure.  He was dominant in the entertainment industry 
and would blacklist those who did not bend to his will.12  His retaliation 
 
6. Id. at 40–41, 52, 128–30, 251. 
7. Id. at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252. 
8. Id. at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.  These financial payouts were typically of 
minimal consequence to Weinstein’s wealth, but had real consequences for young actresses and 
media executives who faced the prospect that, if they challenged Weinstein, they might not work 
again.  Id. at 239–40. 
9. Id. at 63–64. 
10. Id. at 61–62.  The media campaign waged by Weinstein was particularly vicious. It 
drummed up claims that she was somehow involved in the corruption of Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi who carried on a series of affairs.  Id.  It was, as Farrow accurately described it, 
purposeful “slut shaming” of Gutierrez through Weinstein’s media influence.  Id. 
11. Id. at 72. 
12. Id. at 238–40.  A prominent example was Weinstein telling director Peter Jackson that 
he should not hire Mira Sorvino or Ashley Judd for The Lord of the Rings because they were “a 
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against actress Annabella Sciorra  may have prevented her from working in 
film for three years.13  Weinstein also had deep political connections, partic-
ularly in New York.14  His connection to Bill and Hillary Clinton led to a 
staff member for Hillary pressuring Farrow against pursuing the Weinstein 
story.15  This was significant since Farrow had worked for Hillary Clinton at 
the State Department.16  Connections within Weinstein’s team had more di-
rect impact, as Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr., who chose not 
to prosecute Weinstein for his sexual assault on Ambra Gutierrez, practiced 
law with and received significant campaign contributions from lawyers 
within Weinstein’s team.17  Weinstein pressured executives at NBC to pre-
vent Farrow from pursuing the story personally and through intermediaries.18  
Weinstein eventually engaged in direct pressure through a variety of con-
tacts, threats of litigation, and cease and desist letters from his legal team.19  
He also personally contacted Farrow’s sources to pressure them into si-
lence.20  The more Farrow pushed for the truth, the more Weinstein’s ma-
chinery pushed back through licit and illicit channels. 
 
nightmare to work with and we should avoid them at all costs.”  Id.  When Rose McGowan told 
another studio that Weinstein had raped her, the studio promptly terminated her contract.  Id. at 
115. 
13. Id. at 303–05. 
14. Id. at 173–74.  He had been a significant contributor to New York political figures 
George Pataki, Kirsten Gillibrand, Eric Schneiderman, and Andrew Cuomo—covering state and 
federal bases and both major political parties. 
15. Id. at 11–12, 154–55. 
16. Id.  Clinton also became the only living secretary of state not to participate in an inter-
view for a book on American foreign policy that Farrow was contemporaneously writing.  Id. at 
298–99. 
17. Id. at 59–61. 
18. Id. at 73–74, 108, 148–49, 178, 187–89.  Weinstein’s pressure on NBC took a variety 
of forms, including suggesting that Farrow had a conflict of interest because his father (film director 
Woody Allen) had allegedly sexually assaulted Farrow’s sister and Farrow had supported her.  Id. 
at 188–89.  Weinstein deployed others to suggest to Farrow that Weinstein could “clear things up” 
and that he might be “taking action” in some fashion.  Id. at 77–79. 
19. Id. at 210–11, 213–15, 233–36. 
20. Id. at 255–56. 
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Weinstein’s pressure campaign was enabled by his ability to gather in-
formation about his victims and reporters through means of varying impro-
priety.  Not least significant was his retention of the espionage firm, Black 
Cube, to conduct surveillance and investigate Farrow while he was investi-
gating Weinstein.21  Black Cube agents, retained by Weinstein’s law firm, 
Boies Schiller,22 spied on Farrow, other journalists, and Weinstein’s vic-
tims.23  Black Cube used agents operating under false names,24 a “spy pen” 
to record conversations,25 threats,26 and programs to “strip-mine” cell 
phones.27  For this work, the firm was paid more than $1 million by Boies 
Schiller on behalf of Weinstein.28  Black Cube, while the most nefarious, was 
not the only firm Weinstein used.29  K2, another espionage firm that Wein-
stein used, conducted extensive background investigations of accusers, lev-
eraging a “revolving door” of employees who moved from the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s Office into private investigation work for wealthy clients 
like Weinstein.30  Through this spying campaign Weinstein was able to track 
the investigation almost to the minute and maintain a relative information 
advantage. 
 
21. Id. at 12–13, 310–21. 
22. Id. at 95–96. 
23. See id. at 314–15. 
24. See id. at 319–20.  This effort was particularly devoted to trying to get influence over 
Weinstein victim Rose McGowan to derail the release of her book, which would detail her allega-
tions.  Id. at 318. 
25. Id. at 365–68. 
26. Id. at 328–29. 
27. Id. at 319. 
28. Id. at 315. 
29. Id. at 326–27. 
30. Id. 
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Third, Weinstein employed a collection of connected and influential 
lawyers.  This included David Boies,31 Rudy Giuliani,32 Herb Wachtell,33 
lawyers who had previously worked closely with Manhattan District Attor-
ney Cyrus Vance, Jr.,34 and Lanny Davis, long time legal “fixer” for Bill and 
Hillary Clinton.35  Weinstein’s legal team also included civil rights lawyer 
Lisa Bloom.36  Bloom’s involvement was noteworthy because she had rep-
resented several prominent sexual assault victims and was in regular contact 
with Farrow about his investigation, but never disclosed that she was retained 
by Weinstein.37  This team of legal powerhouses sought to exploit reputa-
tions, connections, and use intimidation to prevent the Weinstein story from 
coming to light.38 
Fourth, Weinstein engaged other media contacts in the practice of 
“catch and kill,” which gave rise to Farrow’s book title.  This worked most 
extensively through American Media Inc. (“AMI”), the parent company of 
tabloid newspaper The National Enquirer.39  The “catch and kill” practice 
involves paying for a story, typically one damaging or critical of a public 
figure such as Weinstein or Donald Trump, known as the “catch,” and then 
not running it, known as the “kill.”40  Weinstein worked with AMI to silence 
 
31. Id. at 12–13. 
32. Id. at 60–62. 
33. Id. at 124. 
34. See id. at 75–76, 164, 221–22. 
35. Id. at 91–92.  Davis’s shady reputation was captured by Farrow’s partner’s observation 
as to who might have a phone number for him, “I don’t know, Pol Pot?” 
36. Id. at 234–37. 
37. Id. at 71–74, 103–04, 120. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 16–20, 327–28. 
40. Id. at 346–47.  Again, non-disclosure agreements are a key part of the formula.  The 
purchase of stories was made exclusive and paired with agreements not to disclose.  Id. at 332–36.  
Thus, AMI effectively owned reality, or key portions of it.  Id. at 344–45.  With this came signifi-
cant influence over public figures.  Id. at 16–19, 336–38.  AMI overtly acknowledged engaging in 
“blackmail” to silence some stories to get to others.  Id. 
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some stories and disseminate others to advance his ends.41  Weinstein be-
came enormously confident in his ability to control media coverage.42 
Lastly, Farrow encountered resistance to his reporting from within 
NBC News itself.  As his investigation progressed, NBC News and NBCU-
niversal (the parent company of NBC News), grew increasingly resistant to 
his reporting.43  Resistance came in several forms.  One instance was based 
on legal concerns such as tortious interference with contract claims based on 
reporting from sources who breached non-disclosure agreements.44  Other 
concerns were cultural, as some executives in NBC News seemed resistant 
to creating controversy or complying with journalistic ethics.45  NBC News 
resistance became so severe that Farrow was frozen out of additional work 
for the network, was quietly released from his contract, and had to take the 
Weinstein story elsewhere.46  He eventually got the story into print with The 
New Yorker.47  Lawyers for the magazine rejected as absurd arguments about 
tortious interference with contract and defamation that NBC News had ca-
pitulated to.48  When Farrow’s story eventually broke, NBC News was criti-
cized for not maintaining good journalistic standards.49 
The problem at NBC News, however, ran more deeply.  NBC News 
was severely compromised by the presence of sexual predators in its own 
 
41. Id. at 54, 327–28. 
42. Id. at 178, 231–32.  Weinstein, after convincing NBC News to hold Farrow’s story, 
bragged that he could certainly do the same with The New York Times which contemporaneously 
investigated Weinstein.  Id.  He also bragged to people around him about his ability to dictate media 
coverage he wanted.  Id. at 108. 
43. Id. at 64–65, 86–87, 118–19, 136–38, 141–43, 145–46, 153–54, 161–64, 179–80. 
44. Id. at 65. 
45. Id. at 176–78, 187–90, 197–99, 213–15, 275–77. 
46. Id. at 228, 230–31.   
47. Id. at 208–09. 
48. Id. at 218–19, 234–36, 265–66. 
49. Id. at 276, 289.  Efforts Farrow made to not disparage NBC News broke down when 
Rachael Maddow, host of an NBCUniversal owned network show, pressed Farrow about the refusal 
of NBC News to run the story, and elicited the fact that the story had been ready and reportable but 
NBC News declined to air it.  Id. at 290–93. 
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midst.50  It had used non-disclosure agreements to hide sexual harassment 
and assault by Today Show host Matt Lauer, and executives involved with 
the Weinstein story.51  Weinstein leveraged knowledge of the culture of sex-
ual impropriety at NBC News to prevent his story from coming to light.52  
The network faced a mutually assured destruction situation which led them 
to put the brakes on Farrow’s reporting.  Ultimately, NBC News had a cul-
ture of sexual assault, compelled silence, and prioritizing business over jour-
nalism that made reporting the Weinstein story difficult.53 
Farrow’s reporting, standing alone, presents a disturbing tale.  It in-
volves horrible crimes by sexual predators, cowardice and complicity by 
powerful figures, and failures of corporate integrity.  Those realities alone 
make Catch and Kill an important read.  It is the central role of lawyers, 
however, that makes it particularly important for them to read.  The involve-
ment of lawyers—both in failing to stop or affirmatively enabling miscon-
duct—is a central aspect of the book. 
III. WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? 
The ethical lapses by attorneys surrounding Weinstein were legion—
many so glaring as to be impossible to be considered mere mistakes.  Their 
first area of misconduct is one of the most basic: conflict of interest.  Lisa 
Bloom and David Boies both had profound conflicts in the course of repre-
senting Weinstein. 
Farrow knew Lisa Bloom because his sister, herself a victim of sexual 
assault, had been publicly defended by Bloom during her case.54  Bloom had 
also appeared on Farrow’s television show talking about sexual misconduct 
cases involving celebrities.55  Farrow disclosed that he was investigating 
Weinstein when, while generally discussing non-disclosure agreements in 
 
50. Id. at 370–74. 
51. Id. at 372–77, 390–93.  It is easy to grossly understate Lauer’s misconduct.  He had in 
fact anally raped a subordinate co-worker who had been drinking and pushed her to keep quiet 
about it.  Id. 
52. Id. at 395. 
53. Id. at 398–400. 
54. Id. at 71–73. 
55. Id. 
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sexual abuse cases, Bloom told Farrow it would be useful to know who they 
were discussing.56  The conversation went so far as Bloom mentioning names 
of potential lawyers to two of the victims Farrow had interviewed.57  During 
his investigation, she periodically contacted Farrow with questions.58  She 
also offered ideas on collateral stories and asked very specific questions 
about whether Farrow had seen non-disclosure agreements and how many 
witnesses he had.59   
When Farrow’s story neared publication, he read a cease-and-desist let-
ter from Weinstein lawyers with “a jolt.”60  Lisa Bloom was one of the law-
yers representing Weinstein.61  When Farrow confronted Bloom she pointed 
out that she had mentioned that she knew Weinstein and David Boies.62  
However, Bloom never said she was working for Weinstein while “confi-
dentially” consulting with Farrow, and she had contemporaneously entered 
a book contract with Weinstein.63  Even at this point she tried to manipulate 
Farrow, telling him, “you need to come in. I can help. I can talk to David and 
Harvey. I can make this easier for you.”64  Bloom also suggested that Rose 
McGowan, to whom she had previously provided names of possible counsel, 
was “crazy.”65  The former victim advocate acted as a public relations flack 
for Weinstein, seeking to portray him as the product of a different cultural 
time and place who had engaged in “mild indiscretions,” not sexual assault.66 
 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 73.  Rose McGowan contacted one of the lawyers Bloom identified. 
58. Id. at 74, 103–04, 120. 
59. Id. at 103–04, 120. 
60. Id. at 233–36. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 237. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 270–71. 
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Bloom’s conduct was as unethical as it was inexplicable.  Bloom con-
sistently failed to disclose that Weinstein was a client while advising and 
soliciting information from Farrow.  She did not disclose her role when she 
suggested lawyers to represent Weinstein accusers.  This failure violated her 
obligation not to imply, or at minimum, correct a clearly erroneous impres-
sion that she was disinterested.67  Bloom also had an obligation not to be 
untruthful in assisting Weinstein to advance his fraudulent and criminal con-
duct.68  At a more general level, her communications with Farrow involved 
acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.69 
Weinstein’s primary lawyer, David Boies, likewise engaged in unethi-
cal conduct.  He too labored under conflicts of interest, using the espionage 
firm Black Cube to try and stop The New York Times from publishing a 
Weinstein exposé while his firm represented the newspaper.70  This was a 
direct conflict among current clients, a clear ethical violation.71  Retention of 
Black Cube by the Boies Schiller firm was also ethically suspect given that 
an expert Farrow interviewed said: “It’s impossible to do what they do with-
out breaking the law.”72  At the direction of Weinstein’s lawyers, Black Cube 
operatives used illegal means and violations of privacy rights to obtain in-
formation about his victims and investigators.73  This constituted fraud upon 
 
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  Her conduct 
was potentially prejudicial to the administration of justice by preventing information of accusers 
from coming to light and impeding the expeditious prosecution of Weinstein.  Id. at r. 8.4(d). 
70. FARROW, supra note 1, at 314–15. 
71.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  Although less 
certain on its face, it seems improbable that Boies could deploy an espionage firm against The New 
York Times to disrupt the Weinstein reporting without using confidential information to its disad-
vantage.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (prohibiting dis-
closure of confidential client information except in limited circumstances); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (prohibiting use of information relating to client 
disadvantage without written consent). 
72. FARROW, supra note 1, at 315.  Another Israeli based private intelligence firm told 
Farrow that “[m]ore than fifty percent of what they do is illegal.”  Id. 
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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third parties,74 dishonesty, illegality, and general misconduct.75  Those vio-
lations were not obviated by the fact that they were conducted by third parties 
working for Weinstein’s lawyers.76  It also appears that improper conduct by 
Boies in relation to sexual predators was not limited to his work for Wein-
stein.77 
Lawyers also facilitated suppression and destruction of evidence re-
garding Weinstein.78  The case of Ambra Gutierrez is a central example of 
this. Gutierrez reported her 2015 sexual assault by Weinstein to police.79  
Working with New York police, she obtained a recorded admission by Wein-
stein that he had groped her.80  Despite this, Gutierrez was subjected to grill-
ing by prosecutors who eventually announced that the case would not be 
prosecuted, much to the displeasure of the investigating officers.81  When 
 
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4. 
76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a). 
77. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., Jeffrey Epstein, Blackmail and a Lucrative ‘Hot 
List’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/30/business/david-boies-
pottinger-jeffrey-epstein-videos.html [https://perma.cc/Z8AR-N2NL].  Ironically, The New York 
Times reporting suggests that Boies engaged in later acts of questionable ethics in order to try and 
rehabilitate his image after representing Weinstein.  See id.  Boies and John Stanley Pottinger in-
tended to obtain footage produced by Jeffrey Epstein of sexual misconduct to submit demand letters 
to prominent targets to leverage settlements with payments to charitable foundations.  See id.  Doing 
so would involve pursuing claims of some questionable merit.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  It also arguably constitutes extortion.  Stuart P. Green, 
Theft By Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 553, 573–74 
(2005). 
78. FARROW, supra note 1, at 285. 
79. Id. at 56–57. 
80. Id. at 57–58. 
81. Id. at 59–60.  Police described the questioning by prosecutors as being in line with what 
they would have expected from Weinstein’s defense lawyers.  Id.  The Manhattan District Attorney 
at the time was Cyrus Vance, Jr., who had extensive connections to Weinstein lawyers, including 
Boies.  Id. at 60–61. 
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Farrow pursued her story, a line prosecutor reported that nothing in the in-
vestigation suggested Gutierrez was anything but truthful.82 
Additionally, key evidence from the case inexplicably vanished.  As 
part of a settlement, Gutierrez had to surrender all copies of the Weinstein 
confession to his lawyers.83  Law enforcement was not subject to that agree-
ment, but the recording somehow vanished from the district attorney’s office 
file.84  The recording was explicitly referenced in the investigation reports, 
but missing.85  When Farrow sought comment from Weinstein, he was in-
credulous and outraged that a copy of the confession still existed.86  Wein-
stein’s team asserted that there was an agreement with the district attorney’s 
office that all copies of the tape would be destroyed; district attorney’s office 
personnel denied that claim.87  Whether an agreement was reached or not, it 
is indisputable that Weinstein believed that there was a tape and that the tape 
was not in the file.  It is tough to find a more telling reflection of the arro-
gance and moral rot surrounding Weinstein than this angry and open asser-
tion that a deal for the destruction of evidence of his criminal conduct was 
not being honored. 
Again, it appears that lawyers associated with Weinstein worked to vi-
olate the law and, by extension, their ethical obligations.88  More specifically, 
it appears that Weinstein’s lawyers may have worked with prosecutors to 
avoid a legitimate prosecution and destroy evidence of that crime.89 
Moving one step beyond the outright destruction of evidence, Wein-
stein’s lawyers systematically facilitated hiding evidence through oppressive 
non-disclosure agreements.  The settlement agreement with Gutierrez 
 
82. Id. at 55. 
83. Id. at 63–64. 
84. Id. at 66–67. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 285. 
87. Id.  Specifically, Weinstein’s representative asserted that the agreement was between 
the district attorney’s office and “‘our law firm that the tape police had would be destroyed.’”  Id. 
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (explaining that 
lawyers shall not “destroy or conceal” items of evidentiary value). 
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provided for destruction of all evidence she possessed of Weinstein’s con-
fession.90  Weinstein explicitly referenced a non-disclosure agreement with 
one accuser to pressure Farrow against releasing his story.91  Weinstein’s 
many agreements intended to keep evidence of his misconduct from ever 
making its way into the world.92  In addition to these non-disclosure agree-
ments, lawyers around Weinstein facilitated “catch and kill” contracts to 
spike negative stories.93  While not illegal, these agreements suppressed ac-
cess to evidence on a systematic basis.  Because Weinstein’s accusers were 
contracted into silence, law enforcement and journalists were precluded from 
gathering evidence due to that silence and threats of legal action by Wein-
stein.  This too was an ethically questionable preclusion of access to evidence 
by his lawyers.94 
A final ethical lapse by lawyers was the failure of corporate lawyers to 
push back on cultures of sexual abuse and silence at Weinstein’s company 
and NBC News.95  Outsiders identified “‘a large corporate conspiracy’” to 
cover up Weinstein’s misconduct.96  Board members pushed back on Wein-
stein and attempted to bring his abuses to light, but lawyers, including the 
ubiquitous David Boies, successfully resisted on his behalf for Weinstein.97  
Likewise, at NBC News, the corporate machine was able to hide patterns of 
misconduct by prominent on-air personalities and executives.98  This in-
cluded using non-disclosure agreements to hide sexual harassment claims 
against executives who suppressed the Weinstein story and news of Matt 
 
90. FARROW, supra note 1, at 62–64. 
91. Id. at 285. 
92. Id. at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252. 
93. Id. at 54, 327–28. 
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a). 
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
96. FARROW, supra note 1, at 291. 
97. Id. at 273–74. 
98. See id. at 290–91. 
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Lauer’s rape of a co-worker.99  Enabling this culture of silence pitted lawyers 
directly against the openness and integrity expected of a journalistic outlet 
and the best interests of the company.100  In the course of seeking to suppress 
Lauer’s misconduct and that of others, NBC lawyers leveraged linguistic 
technicalities to not admit settlements,101 intimidated victims with non-dis-
closure agreements,102 and pursued secrecy rather than openness and reme-
dial action at the corporate governance level.103  NBC lawyers even tried to 
pressure Farrow’s publishers to prevent the release of his unrelated foreign 
policy book.104  When it involved one of their own, NBC News executives 
and lawyers seemed to value protecting on-air talent, their careers, and 
avoiding public embarrassment of the NBC brand more than journalism.  
NBC lawyers and journalists seemed to be occupying very different cultures 
when push came to shove. 
What does this depressing litany of lawyer misconduct tell us?  Some 
important things, actually. 
First and foremost, it reiterates the responsibility lawyers have as mem-
bers of a profession that regulates itself.  Professional responsibility begins 
with individual lawyers knowing the rules and following them.  When con-
siderations like big fees, pleasing famous or powerful clients, or having pub-
lic prominence are given primacy over ethical behavior, lawyers engage in 
misconduct.  The profession suffers as a result.  It is impossible to say if 
these concerns motivated Bloom, Boies, or NBC lawyers, but their lapses are 
impossible to ignore.  They are a cautionary tale to all lawyers to place pro-
fessionalism first. 
Compliance begins with individual lawyers; enforcement begins with 
the profession.  Lawyers themselves enforce the rules, including the 
 
99. See id. at 174–75, 213–14, 375–77, 384–85. 
100. See id. at 372–73 (recounting NBC counsel telling reporters that it would help NBC if 
“the press” would stop covering Lauer’s misconduct); id. at 394–95 (recounting Weinstein efforts 
to blackmail NBC News to suppress his story by threatening to expose Lauer). 
101. Id. at 375. 
102. Id. at 379. 
103. See id. at 394–95. 
104. Id. at 402–03. 
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obligation to report serious misconduct.105  In the case of the Weinstein law-
yers, however, the profession failed.  No record of public discipline exists 
for any of them.106  At some level, the failure of the profession to sanction 
patterns of misconduct by lawyers, particularly prominent lawyers for the 
rich and powerful, is a systemic failure as disturbing as the systemic preda-
tion of Weinstein and others.  If professional responsibility—and the collec-
tive enforcement of it—breaks down in favor of secondary concerns, the le-
gal profession risks being lost.  If for no other reason, wrestling with this 
question makes Catch and Kill a worthy read for any lawyer. 
Second, the conduct of these lawyers reflects a failure to consider them-
selves as moral actors and leaders.  Lawyers facilitating the conduct of sexual 
predators through their work raises the question of their moral, not merely 
legal, responsibility.107  Lawyers can take the view that their moral responsi-
bility is limited to their role, meaning that the lawyer need only comply with 
the client’s wishes and is not a moral actor beyond that.108  Certainly lawyers 
around Weinstein and others appear to have limited their moral responsibil-
ity to carrying out the directives of their clients within the outermost bound-
aries of the law.  The results demonstrate that when lawyers abdicate moral 
responsibility, others can pay the price. 
So too when lawyers fail to accept their responsibility as leaders.109  
When lawyers fail to act as leaders, moral rot can occur around the clients 
they represent and highly negative consequences follow.110  Lawyers must 
 
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer who 
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that 
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”). 
106. Many jurisdictions provide for private reprimand or other confidential disciplinary 
measures.  It is possible that this took place. 
107. See Robert J. Muise, Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment 
of Conscience, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 795–96 (1996). 
108. See id. 
109. See, e.g., ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, DANGEROUS LEADERS: HOW AND WHY 
LAWYERS MUST BE TAUGHT TO LEAD 3–4 (2018) (noting that lawyers have an obligation to lead 
by speaking up to clients about the possible impacts of decisions). 
110. See id. at 72–75. 
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bring moral conduct to their work for clients.111  But all too often, moral 
action is abdicated by lawyers.112  Lawyers have the ability to take responsi-
bility and address the consequences of actions by their clients, manifesting 
true leadership in doing so.113  Alas, the lawyers around Weinstein and NBC 
News utterly failed to do so.  They facilitated the worst impulses of their 
clients when they could have been moral leaders.  Their failure makes clear 
the need for lawyers to be moral leaders and the enormous harm that can 
come when they do not.114   
IV. SHOULD SILENCE BE FOR SALE? 
Farrow’s book is also a lens to look at the ongoing validity of non-
disclosure agreements.  Those agreements have had profoundly negative 
consequences for victims of sexual misconduct.  They allowed the conduct 
of Weinstein,115 Matt Lauer,116 President Trump,117 and other powerful men 
to be hidden from view.  They allowed media companies like AMI to gain 
blackmail power over public figures and affect public events as a result.118  
Catch and Kill raises the question of whether these contracts should be al-
lowed.119 
 
111. DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 84–85 (2017). 
112. See id. at 90–91. 
113. Id. at 127–28. 
114. THOMPSON, supra note 109, at 55–56. 
115. FARROW, supra note 1, at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.   
116. Id. at 372–77, 390–93. 
117. Id. at 346–47. 
118. Id. at 16–19; id. 336–38. 
119. It may be argued that preventing such contracts prevents parties to disputed claims 
from keeping potentially embarrassing information to themselves.  Parties who believe they will be 
embarrassed or upset by the disclosure of information can simply choose to remain silent.  For most 
private citizens, this will likely be enough to maintain confidentiality.  It is more complicated with 
public figures, however.  There is a greater interest to know about their private conduct, some 
positive and some simply prurient.  Even in the context of public figures, however, if the parties 
keep the matter to themselves it is very likely that no one else will hear of it.  Contrast the negative 
effects of some public figures having their misconduct disclosed with the ability of public figures 
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It is well settled that contracts can be unenforceable for reasons of be-
ing illegal or contrary to public policy.120  For contracts not made expressly 
illegal by positive law, the question is whether the interest in their enforce-
ment is outweighed by public interest against enforcement.121  Under the 
common law doctrine  the “public interest” of enforcing a contract is consid-
ered in the context of the values of the time and place, as well as the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case.122  In different times and places the 
doctrine has been used to invalidate contracts for gambling, prostitution, in-
terference with business requirements or voting rights, divorce, or other 
transgressions of “public morality.”123  The doctrinal touchstone has been 
that if enforcing a contract hurts the public, it will not be.124 
An increasing number of courts and scholars have wrestled with the 
question of enforcing non-disclosure agreements in the context of sexual 
misconduct.125  Beyond common law development, some legislatures have 
considered or adopted statutes making non-disclosure agreements 
 
to hide their misconduct on a systematic basis.  The public harm of the use of widespread nondis-
closure agreements outweighs the potential impact on individuals in their unavailability. 
120. Sandra S. Baron et al., Tortious Interference: The Limits of Common Law Liability for 
News Gathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1027, 1031 (1996). 
121. Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for Reasons of Public 
Policy, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 424–25 (2016) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 778 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)). 
122. Id. at 425–26. 
123. Id. at 426–27.  
124. Id. at 426.  
125. See, e.g., Ryan Philp, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in Non-
Disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 845, 870–73 (2003) (discussing various scholarly 
treatments of non-disclosure agreements and proposed balancing tests to determine their enforcea-
bility).  It has also been suggested that such agreements should be assessed for reasonableness to 
determine enforceability, much like agreements in restraint of trade are; Joan C. Williams et al., 
What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 139, 198–201 (2019) (discussing application of “reasonableness” test to determine if non-
disclosure agreements are enforceable in employment settings).  Such a test would evaluate the 
scope of the agreement, the context and purpose of disclosure, and the interests of employers, em-
ployees, and the public to determine enforceability; id. at 205–15.  Certainly, given Farrow’s dis-
cussion of many Weinstein non-disclosure agreements as significantly power imbalanced transac-
tions, almost contracts of adhesion, there is a serious question if they would hold up under such a 
reasonableness review for enforceability.   
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unenforceable against sexual assault victims or whistleblowers.126  At a crit-
ical juncture, the greatest contribution of Catch and Kill may be providing a 
high profile demonstration of the enormous public costs of these agreements, 
which can advance that debate.  The costs are visible in several concrete 
ways. 
First, and most obviously, these agreements allow wealthy predators to 
go undetected and unpunished.  If not forever, certainly for the time neces-
sary to add to their list of victims.  Weinstein did.127  Lauer did.128  NBC 
News executives did.129  The grim reality that purchasing silence is purchas-
ing additional opportunity to offend is a heavy public cost which weighs 
against allowing non-disclosure agreements regarding sexual misconduct to 
be enforceable.130  By showing the public and policy makers how these 
agreements allow predators to hide, Catch and Kill provides an important 
contribution to the development of contract law. 
Second, some of these contracts extended to conduct that was criminal.  
While some of Weinstein’s accusers alleged “mere” sexual harassment, oth-
ers alleged rape.  Lauer’s victim described an anal rape.131  Criminal miscon-
duct typically cannot be the basis of an enforceable non-disclosure agree-
ment in any context.132  There is a valid question of why rapists should be 
allowed to contract away evidence of their crimes.  Stated differently, does 
society want to allow contracts for conspiracies of criminal silence, particu-
larly when that allows the underlying criminal activity to continue? 
Third, these agreements have a significant deterrent effect on those who 
might bring sexual abuse to light.  Weinstein forcefully leveraged his agree-
ments against NBC News, The New Yorker, and other media outlets to 
 
126. David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 
167–68 (2019) (discussing debate in New York and other jurisdictions). 
127. FARROW, supra note 1, at 47–48, 63–64, 219, 221, 233–40, 252.  
128. Id. at 372–77, 390–93. 
129. Id. at 375–76, 398–400. 
130. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 126, at 173–75.  
131. FARROW, supra note 1, at 385. 
132. Baron et al., supra note 120, at 1031.  
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suppress reporting his misconduct.133  It certainly had a chilling effect on 
Farrow’s reporting at NBC.134  Scholars conclude that tortious interference 
claims against the media for reporting information subject to non-disclosure 
agreements are probably not viable.135  Regardless of whether those cases 
ultimately prevail, their threat can significantly deter reporting on sexual 
misconduct as it did in the Weinstein case.  Non-disclosure agreements ap-
pear to also have interfered with law enforcement in the Ambra Gutierrez 
case.136  Catch and Kill documents how private non-disclosure agreements 
can undermine the public right to know and obtain evidence of crimes 
brought forward for prosecution.  This weighs strongly against the enforce-
ability of such agreements. 
Fourth, use of these agreements as part of the “catch and kill” system 
allows unscrupulous media outlets to obtain enormous leverage over public 
figures.137  For example, AMI expressly acknowledged the blackmail power 
this provided.138  The detrimental impact to the public can be seen in AMI’s 
attempt to swing the 2016 presidential election by helping Michael Cohen 
catch and kill the story of Stephanie Clifford’s affair with Donald Trump.139  
Allowing elections or other important public events to be disrupted by the 
intentional suppression of information has a destructive effect on the public.  
By purchasing stories to control them, AMI could leverage individuals, high-
light or hide stories based on how it helped the company, and control what 
the “truth” is.  These agreements let certain outlets gain an enforceable mo-
nopoly on stories.  Paired with an impulse to leverage rather than report 
them, it gives stunning power to those outlets.  The possibility to abuse such 
contracts is enormous and apparent.  This too is a reason that “catch and kill” 
agreements should not be enforceable. 
 
133. FARROW, supra note 1, at 214–15, 217. 
134. Id. 
135. Baron et al., supra note 120, at 1032–35.  
136. FARROW, supra note 1, at 285. 
137. Id. at 16–19; 336–38. 
138. Id. at 346.  
139. Id. at 353. 
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There are other public costs to enforcing these types of agreements.  
They lead to increased employment turnover.140  They promote insecurity in 
the workplace for other employees.141  The resulting culture can embolden 
abusers and discourage victims.142  The social costs of such agreements are, 
in short, very high.  As a result, courts and some legislators have rejected 
them.143  Catch and Kill is not presented against a blank slate.  What should 
be done with it? 
Courts should recognize the void against public policy doctrine in this 
context and apply it consistently.  Appellate courts should synthesize and 
clarify application of the doctrine.  Practitioners and academic lawyers 
should continue to raise awareness of the limited enforceability of agree-
ments that seek to hide evidence of criminal conduct or whistleblower re-
ports.  Practitioners should consider if they are valid provisions to include in 
contracts going forward.  Lastly, legislatures should consider passing addi-
tional laws expanding and clarifying the limits on these agreements.  Catch 
and Kill is a valuable contribution because it shows in graphic and jarring 
terms the importance of doing so.  Lives are genuinely at stake. 
V. UNHAPPILY EVER AFTER IN HOLLYWOOD? 
It might seem surprising that a page-turner about Hollywood miscon-
duct can usefully discuss a lot of practical issues that lawyers face.  But 
Catch and Kill does just that, and as a result, is an important book for lawyers 
to read.  It presents difficult issues of professional responsibility, leadership 
and moral action, and contract law in stark fashion.  Lawyers who read it will 
be challenged to think about how to respond as individuals and as a profes-
sion to challenges of professional regulation, client management, and main-
taining personal values.  Any lawyer can use Catch and Kill to consider the 
role of lawyers and the law as moral forces in business and society. 
All these important questions are presented in a gripping, well-written 
tale.  A thinking lawyer’s page-turner is worth the time and effort.  Catch 
and Kill is such a book.  Lawyers—and those with interest in the legal pro-
fession—would do well to take note. 
 
140. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 126, at 178. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. at 178–79. 
143. Philp, supra note 125, at 872–74; Baron et al., supra note 120, at 1032–34. 
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EPILOGUE: THE WEINSTEIN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 
On February 24, 2020, a Manhattan jury convicted Harvey Weinstein 
of first-degree criminal sexual act and third-degree rape.144  He was immedi-
ately remanded to custody.145  Weinstein was sentenced to serve twenty-three 
years in prison after unrepentantly telling the court that his experience was 
like those blacklisted in the communist scares of the 1950s.146  Separate pros-
ecution for rape and sexual assault awaited Weinstein in Los Angeles.147  The 
verdict, Weinstein’s sentence, and how they were arrived at is a necessary 
coda to any consideration of Catch and Kill. 
An inevitable, if simplistic, question about an event like this is: What 
does it mean?  What Weinstein’s conviction and sentence mean probably 
depends on the perspective from which they are assessed. 
For Harvey Weinstein, it means that a predator was finally brought to 
justice (if incompletely, given that most of Weinstein’s victims were not part 
of the case).148  Given that he was sixty-seven years old at the time of his 
conviction, and had significant health issues almost immediately after being 
sentenced, it may also mean that Weinstein spends the rest of his life in 
prison.149  But it did not bring Weinstein to a point where he chose to apolo-
gize to anyone for anything.150 
 
144. See Alan Feuer, 5 Takeaways From the Weinstein Verdict, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-rape-guilty.html [https://
perma.cc/7VF9-GLJB]. 
145. See id. 
146. Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein’s Stunning Downfall: 23 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-sentenc-
ing.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/4NPZ-Q5MB]. 
147. Id. 
148. Id.  The sentencing judge noted that “[a]lthough this is a first conviction, it is not a 
first offense.  There is evidence before me of other incidents of sexual assault involving a number 
of women all of which are legitimate considerations for sentence.”  Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See id. 
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For Weinstein’s victims, his conviction and sentence bring some level 
of closure,151 with his status as a sexual predator now a matter of record.  But 
that closure is not for all his victims nor without substantial costs.152  Pursu-
ing justice against powerful predators was not easy for these women, nor 
does the conviction of one predator alter the power equation for victims of 
sexual assault by powerful men.153 
For Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, the verdict adds to a 
mixed legacy.  Indisputably, the Weinstein prosecution and conviction 
pushed the envelope of prosecuting powerful predators.154  It may pave the 
way for more prosecutions of high-profile predators in the face of complex 
evidentiary and legal issues,155 for which Vance’s office deserves praise.  
However, the verdict necessarily revives questions about why Vance’s office 
did not previously prosecute Weinstein on the force of the recordings ob-
tained by Ambra Gutierrez and why the office dismissed other high-profile 
sexual assault cases.156  For Vance, the conviction adds layers of complexity.   
Weinstein’s conviction following a complicated investigation and trial 
puts front and center the societal response to sexual assault and harass-
ment.157  Several accusing witnesses had sexual relationships with Weinstein 
after their assaults.158  Slut shaming survived the trial, even thrived actually, 
as Weinstein’s lawyer Donna Rotunno argued that a conviction would pro-
mote “a universe that strips adult women of common sense, autonomy and 
 
151. Megan Twohey & Jodi Kantor, With Weinstein Conviction, Jury Delivers a Verdict 
on #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/us/harvey-wein-
stein-verdict-metoo.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/36SM-RD8D]. 
152. Id. 
153. Rebecca Solnit, The Harvey Weinstein Verdict Is a Watershed—and a Warning, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/opinion/sunday/harvey-weinstein-
verdict.html [https://perma.cc/9T8P-HLWX]. 
154. Feuer, supra note 144. 
155. Id. 
156. Id.  
157. Solnit, supra note 153. 
158. Feuer, supra note 144. 
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responsibility.”159  That trope was rejected by the jury, however, and may be 
losing social acceptance.160  On the other hand, women are not now simply 
believed without reservation.  The accusers in Weinstein’s trial were not uni-
formly accepted, and the testimony of actress Anabella Sciorra, key to get-
ting Weinstein’s actions into public view, was particularly undercut on cross-
examination as she could not recall months or even years of key events.161  
Human recollection and communication remain uncertain dances, particu-
larly in the fraught environment of sexual relationships.  Ongoing questions 
of consent, power, dynamics, and relationships that alternate between con-
sensual and abusive remain complicated, and fact specific questions.  It also 
remains a reality that sexual relationships, workplaces, and gender percep-
tions in society involve complex questions of psychology, sociology, and 
human nature.  While Weinstein’s conviction may be a watershed moment 
in the #MeToo movement, it is hard to say that it is the pivot point after 
which these questions become clear or easy for anyone.162 
Lastly, this is not the end of powerful men using their power for sexual 
gratification or to impose silence on victims.  Several other credibly accused 
men in the entertainment and news industries remain free, if largely ban-
ished.163  Former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg’s entry into the 
Democratic primary ensured that the use and enforceability of nondisclosure 
agreements would be a significant issue in the second presidential election 
in a row.164  Weinstein’s verdict was an individual conviction, not a societal 
resolution. 
 
159. Twohey & Kantor, supra note 151.  Ms. Rotunno previously argued publicly that she 
had never been a victim of sexual assault because she had the wisdom to never put herself “in that 
position.”  Id.  
160. Id. 
161. Feuer, supra note 144. 
162. Twohey & Kantor, supra note 151. 
163. Nicole Sperling, Harvey Weinstein Is Gone, but Hollywood is Still a Man’s World, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/business/media/harvey-wein-
stein-hollywood.html?referringSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/LU4V-Q3KZ]. 
164. Amber Phillips, Bloomberg Now Says He’ll Release Women From Nondisclosure 
Agreements. Here’s How Those Work, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2020, 1:51 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/20/warren-bloomberg-debate-nondisclosure-agree-
ments/ [https://perma.cc/U6G4-2GME]. 
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In the end, Weinstein’s conviction and sentencing is perhaps the mo-
ment at which his movie begins to end.  But for lawyers and society at large, 
disturbing issues of sexual assault, abuse of power, unethical and unprofes-
sional conducts, and espionage (both corporate and personal) are not a 
movie.  Even with this outcome, there is no “happily ever after,” at least not 
yet. 
